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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's school speech' jurispru-
dence attempts to strike a balance between the authority of school of-
ficials and the First Amendment rights of students. 2 For much of U.S.
history, the decisions of teachers and school officials were considered
part of a field that was left to local and state legislatures3 and beyond
4the competence of the courts. Nevertheless, a significant change oc
curred with the Court's decision in West Virginia State Board of Educa-
tion v. Barnette.5 In holding West Virginia's compulsory flag salute law
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court declared that " [w] e cannot, be-
cause of modest estimates of our competence in such specialties as
* J.D., 2009, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2006, Rutgers University,
Rutgers College. I would like to thank Professor Edward Hartnett for his thoughts,
insights, and comments throughout the writing process.
This Comment uses "school speech" throughout to refer to student expression
that is subject to regulation by school officials. "School speech" and "student speech"
are used interchangeably.
2 See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630 (1943) (hold-
ing a state compulsory flag salute regulation unconstitutional and noting that the
conflict is between "authority and rights of the individual"). The conflict has also
been described as one between the social reproduction model, which views the
school as needing power to instill in students society's traditions and values so that
they can be knowledgeable participants in democratic institutions, and the social re-
construction model, which views schools as needing power "to facilitate the child in
his attempts to construct a new social order." Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students
Have Constitutional Rights? Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
49, 64-70 (1996).
s See David A. Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against
Judicial Intervention, 59 TEx. L. REv. 477, 506-10 (1981).
4 See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629-37 (2007) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 597-98, 600 (1940), overruled by
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
5 319 U.S. 624.
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public education, withhold the judgment that history authenticates as
the function of this Court when liberty is infringed.
6
Twenty-five years after Barnette, the Supreme Court proclaimed
in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District7 that nei-
ther "students [n]or teachers shed their constitutional rights to free-
dom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."' Tinker held
that school officials cannot suppress speech unless it materially and
substantially interferes with the operation of the school or infringes
upon the rights of others; 9 and in doing so, the Court shifted the bal-
ance in favor of students' freedom of expression. Since Tinker, how-
ever, the Court's decisions have gradually scaled back the breadth of
student speech rights.'0 The continuous erosion of student speech
rights has largely been paralleled by the Court's decisions concerning
students' privacy and procedural due process rights." Thus, in the
years after Tinker, the balance has shifted in the direction of greater
deference and power to school officials."
In its most recent school speech case, Morse v. Frederick,'3 the
Court held that schools may restrict student expression that can rea-
sonably be interpreted as promoting illegal drug use.14 Morse essen-
tially created a third exception to Tinker's "material and substantial"
disruption test. The first exception, delineated in Bethel School District
No. 403 v. Fraser, permits school officials to suppress speech that is
"offensively lewd and indecent";'5 the second, delineated in Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, permits the restriction of speech that bears
the imprimatur of the school, so long as the regulation is related "to
legitimate pedagogical concerns."' 6 More important than the fact
6 Id. at 640.
7 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
8 Id. at 506.
9 Id. at 513.
10 See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhl-
meier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
1 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the
Schoolhouse Gates: What's Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 528-29 (2000).
12 See Andrew D.M. Miller, Balancing School Authority and Student Expression, 54
BAYLOR L. REV. 623, 637-41 (2002). Not surprisingly, much ink has been spilled in
the debate concerning the proper balance of school authority and student free
speech rights. Compare, e.g., David L. Hudson, Jr. &John E. Ferguson, Jr., The Courts'
Inconsistent Treatment of Bethel v. Fraser and the Curtailment of Student Rights, 36 J.
MARsHALL L. REV. 181 (2002), with Dupre, supra note 2.
is 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
14 Id. at 2629.
15 478 U.S. at 685.
16 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
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that Morse is another exception to Tinker, it creates a third exception
that allows school officials to silence speech based on its content.17
Content-based restrictions contrast with the Tinker standard, which
condones the suppression of speech based on the effect, or possible
effect, of a student's speech-that is, if it intrudes upon the work of
the school or rights of others. 18
Tinker may not have been explicitly overruled, but in light of
Morse, as well as Fraser and Kuhlmeier (and how these decisions have
been applied by lower courts), this Comment argues that the stan-
dard for school speech cases is gradually shifting toward a primarily
content-based test rather than an effects-based test. This Comment
does not contend that all speech will be analyzed based on its con-
tent. Rather, in addition to the expansion of the content-based re-
strictions of Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse beyond their narrow hold-
ings, other factors-such as greater discretion being accorded to
school officials and general confusion among lower courts about how
to apply school speech cases-increase the probability that speech
will be suppressed based on its content.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the Supreme
Court's school speech decisions and discusses how these decisions
have changed the Court's approach to student speech. Part III looks
specifically at what effect Morse v. Frederick may have and has had on
the free speech rights of students. This analysis involves determining
how Morse fits in with previous school speech decisions. In addition,
Part III discusses a number of decisions that have applied Morse. Part
IV addresses two themes that have developed in the Supreme Court's
school speech jurisprudence-greater discretion and greater confu-
sion. These two factors play a significant role in expanding the ex-
ceptions delineated in Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse. Part IV also dis-
17 See id. ("[E]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editori-
al control over the style and content of student speech .... ) (emphasis added); see
also Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626 ("The [Fraser] Court was plainly attuned to the content of
Fraser's speech .... ) (emphasis added). It should be noted that at least some
courts have interpreted Fraser as permitting the prohibition of speech based on the
manner of the speech, rather than the content. See Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd.
of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971 (S.D. Ohio 2005) ("Rather than being concerned
with the actual content of what is being conveyed, the Fraserjustification for regulat-
ing speech is more concerned with the plainly offensive manner in which it is con-
veyed."). Content-based restrictions are those that prohibit speech based on the dis-
approval of the idea expressed. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377,
382 (1992). Two distinct types of content-based restrictions are viewpoint restrictions
(e.g., restriction prohibiting Democratic or Republican political viewpoint) and sub-
ject matter restrictions (e.g., restriction prohibiting all political speech). KATHLEEN
M. SULLIvAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1193-98 (15th ed. 2004).is Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
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cusses Supreme Court decisions concerning students' privacy and
procedural due process rights and how the principles laid down in
these decisions have affected the Court's school speech jurispru-
dence. Part IV additionally considers the influence that moral panic
has had on the courts' deferential treatment of school officials' deci-
sions to suppress student speech. Finally, Part V argues that Morse
should be limited to its narrow holding, namely because of the like-
lihood that expansion of the decision to speech beyond that advocat-
ing drug use can have a contagion effect.
II. The Road to Morse
Although Tinker is considered by many to be the most important
Supreme Court decision concerning student free speech rights,19 the
Court's decision in Barnette laid the foundation for Tinker by holding
that the decisions of public schools are not beyond the scope of judi-
cial review. 20 In Barnette, the Court held a compulsory flag salute reg-
ulation unconstitutional.2' In so holding, the Court recognized that
boards of education, as arms of the state, are not exempted from the
requirements of the Constitution.22 More significantly, the Court
recognized the importance of protecting students' constitutional
rights-" [t] hat [schools] are educating the young for citizenship is
reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the
individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and
teach youth to discount important principles of our government as
mere platitudes., 2' The Court acknowledged that teachers and ad-
ministrators should be accorded discretion in how they perform their
duties, but when the Bill of Rights is implicated, courts must not shy
away from their own duties as guardians of the rights embodied
therein.24
19 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 527.
20 SeeW. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943); see also Hud-
son & Ferguson, supra note 12, at 184.
21 319 U.S. at 642.
22 Id. at 637.
23 Id. The Supreme Court's decision in Barnete became possible only eighteen
years earlier, after the Court decided Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). There,
the Court ruled that the rights embodied in the First Amendment are among the
fundamental rights protected from infringement by state governments by the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id. at 666.
24 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637-40.
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In part, the Supreme Court's decision in Barnette was influenced
by the rise of Nazism and the ongoing tragedy of World War II.2
5
Merely three years earlier, the Court held constitutional a similar flag
salute regulation in Minersville School District v. Gobitis.26 In Barnette,
the Supreme Court noted that a number of groups objected to the
flag salute as "being too much like Hitler's. 2 7 The Court further
noted that such officially disciplined uniformity has often had dis-
astrous consequences. 28 Thus, the Court not only recognized the ut-
most importance of protecting individual rights, but also the power
of public schools to go beyond inculcating core democratic values to
potentially indoctrinating children.29
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District
Tinker concerned a number of students who wore black arm-
bands to school to publicize their opposition to the Vietnam War.30
Officials of the Des Moines schools became aware of the students'
plan to wear the armbands and adopted a policy prohibiting them.'
The students were subsequently suspended for violating the newly
adopted policy. 32
25 See Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of
Rights, 84 IowA L. REv. 941, 997 (1999); Richard Primus, Note, A Brooding Omnipre-
sence: Totalitarianism in Postwar Constitutional Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 423, 438-39, 450
(1996).
26 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
27 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 627-28.
28 Id. at 637, 640-41. The Court stated:
Probably no deeper division of our people could proceed from any
provocation than from finding it necessary to choose what doctrine
and whose program public educational officials shall compel youth to
unite in embracing. Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel cohe-
rence is the lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp
out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as a
means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to
Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian
enemies.
Id. at 641.
See Solove, supra note 25, at 997 (explaining that at this period in time "state
indoctrination of children appeared as a new and potentially dangerous form of
power" because "Hitler had used the schools to promote Nazi propaganda").
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). The
students and their families decided to wear the armbands during the holiday season
in 1965 and to fast on December 16 and New Year's Eve. Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. The students were told that they were to remain suspended until they re-
turned without their armbands. Id. They did not return to school until after New
Year's Day, after the planned period for wearing the armbands was over. Id.
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In a seven-to-two decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of
the students, holding that the students' conduct did not "materially
and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate dis-
cipline in the operation of the school."33 The Court declared that
students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
... at the schoolhouse gate,0 4 but also recognized that these rights
must be applied "in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment.
3 5
Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, explained that the stu-
dents' conduct was akin to "pure speech," entitled to comprehensive
First Amendment protection.6 Even though some speech may be
controversial, inspire fear, or start an argument, Justice Fortas reaf-
firmed prior decisions that teach that this is a risk that our society
must be willing to take.3 ' Therefore, a student may not be silenced
simply based on undifferentiated fear or apprehension of distur-
bance." Applying this notion to schools in particular, Justice Fortas
stated that "schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism .... In our
system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of
only that which the State chooses to communicate.,
39
Justice Black's dissent was sharply critical of the majority's stu-
dent speech-friendly ruling.4° According to Justice Black, the majori-
ty ushered in a new era in which the power to control public schools
was transferred to the Supreme Court.41 Justice Black further criti-
cized the majority for subjecting public schools "to the whims and ca-
33 Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). Un-
der this standard, mere disagreement with particular speech, or the controversial na-
ture of the speech, cannot be invoked as the basis for lawful restriction. Id. at 508-
09.
Id. at 506.
35 Id.
36 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06, 508.
37 See id. at 508-09 (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)); see also W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943) ("Compulsory unifi-
cation of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.... We can have in-
tellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities that we owe to exceptional
minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes."). Justice
Fortas explained that "history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom ... that is
the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans
who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society." Tinker,
393 U.S. at 508-09.
38 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
39 Id. at511.
40 See id. at 515-27 (Black, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 515.
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prices of their loudest-mouthed, but maybe not their brightest, stu-
dents.,
42
B. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser
Whereas the Court's opinion in Tinker emphasized the need to
protect the fundamental rights of students, in Fraser the Court fo-
cused on the role of public schools in inculcating the "habits and
manners of civility" in their students.43 The case concerned a high
school student, Matthew Fraser, who delivered a speech nominating a
classmate for student government. 44 Throughout the speech, given
during an assembly which was part of a school-sponsored program in
self-government, Fraser referred to the classmate "in terms of an ela-
borate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor."4 5  Fraser was sus-
pended for violating a disciplinary rule prohibiting the use of ob-
scene language."
Both lower courts ruled in favor of Fraser, finding that under
Tinker Fraser's speech did not have a disruptive effect. 47 The Su-
preme Court acknowledged Tinkers holding, but quickly turned its
42 Id. at 525. Writing some thirty years after Tinker, some commentators have ar-
gued that Justice Black's prophecy has to some degree come true. See Dupre, supra
note 2, at 50 ("Researchers have inferred ... that the 'adversarial and legalistic cha-
racter of urban public schools'-qualities attributable to the Court's school jurispru-
dence of recent years-and the corresponding unwillingness of teachers to maintain
order have affected educational quality."); Kay S. Hymowitz, Tinker and the Lessons
From the Slippery Slope, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 547, 555 (2000) ("Simply put, teachers [have]
come to fear their students.").
43 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (internal citation
omitted).
44 Id. at 677.
45 Id. at 678. Though the majority did not feel it necessary to reproduce excerpts
of the speech, Justice Brennan's concurrence provided the following excerpts:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt,
his character is firm-but most.., of all, his belief in you, the students
of Bethel, is firm.... [The candidate] is a man who takes his point and
pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He
doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives hard, pushing and pushing
until finally-he succeeds ....
Id. at 687 (Brennan,J., concurring).
46 Id. at 678-79 (majority opinion).
47 Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1985). Interesting-
ly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the school's ar-
gument that it has an interest in protecting young students from lewd and indecent
language, reasoning that "if school officials had the unbridled discretion to apply a
standard as subjective and elusive as 'indecency' in controlling the speech of high
school students, it would increase the risk of cementing white, middle-class standards
for determining what is acceptable and proper speech and behavior in our public
schools." Id. at 1363.
2009] 1065
HeinOnline -- 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1065 2009
SETON HALL LA WfREVEW
attention to explaining that schools, as well as society, have an inter-
est in teaching students fundamental values and the "boundaries of
socially appropriate behavior. 4  The Court also explained that the
rights of students are not necessarily coextensive with those of adults
in other settings. The Court therefore reasoned that it is an appro-
priate function of public schools to proscribe the use of offensive and
vulgar language in public discourse. °
Turning to Fraser's speech in particular, the Court argued that
Fraser's sexual innuendo was plainly offensive to both students and
teachers. 51 The Court distinguished Fraser's speech from Tinker's
armbands in that Fraser did not express any political viewpoint.5
2
The Court also noted that the "First Amendment does not prevent..
. school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd
speech such as [Fraser's] would undermine the school's basic educa-
tional mission."53 The Court thus concluded that the school acted
appropriately in sanctioning Fraser to demonstrate to the students
that lewd and vulgar speech is inconsistent with the educational mis-
sion of public schools.
5 4
Thus, in Fraser, the Court shied away from the permissive Tinker
standard and carved out an exception to Tinker based on lewd, inde-
cent, and offensive speech.5 5 In addition, the Court exhibited much
48 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681.
49 Id. at 682 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-42 (1985)). Justice
Burger, writing for the majority, seems to have doubted the maturity and ability of
the students of Bethel High School to exercise their constitutional rights, referring
to Fraser as a "confused boy," id. at 683, and repeatedly referring to the students in
the audience as "children," id. at 682, 684. This characterization by Justice Burger
may reflect fundamentally differing views of children in Tinker and Fraser. Whereas
Tinker views the student as a "citizen-child" worthy of civic participation and constitu-
tional rights, Fraser seems to take a more pessimistic view of the ability of the child to
exercise these rights appropriately, and thus affords school officials more authority
to curtail them. See Hymowitz, supra note 42, at 553-55, 558-61.
50 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 685.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 685-86.
55 Noteworthy is Justice Brennan's opinion in which he concurred with the
Court's judgment but advocated a narrow reading of the majority opinion. See id. at
687-91 (Brennan, J., concurring). According toJustice Brennan, the suppression of
speech in this instance was permissible due to the school's interest in ensuring that
the assembly proceeded in an orderly manner. Id. at 689. Because of the setting, the
school's interest in maintaining civil public discourse was especially weighty. Id. Jus-
tice Brennan thus opined that the Court's holding concerned only "the authority
that school officials have to restrict a high school student's use of disruptive language
in a speech given to a high school assembly." Id. (emphasis added).
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deference in accepting the judgment of the school officials that Fras-
er's speech disrupted the school's educational mission."
C. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
Only two years after Fraser, the Supreme Court decided what
would be called the third installment in the "Tinker trilogy."57 Kuhl-
meier concerned a high school principal who decided to remove two
articles from the school newspaper because of confidentiality issues
regarding students who were mentioned in the articles, and because
he believed that references in the articles to sexual activity and birth
control were inappropriate for some younger students. s
The majority opinion began by reiterating that students do not
"shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate, 59 but also reaffirmed that school officials
need not "tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic
educational mission, even though the government could not censor
similar speech outside the school."6 The Court also stated that the
decision as to what speech is appropriate in the classroom or in a
school assembly is one that properly rests with school officials and not
the federal courts.6 A student's First Amendment claim, the Court
explained, must be considered in this context.
62
The Court next concluded that the school newspaper was a non-
public forum, and as such, the contents thereof could be regulated in
any reasonable manner. 63 Therefore, reasonableness-not Tinker-is
the standard that applies to student speech that bears the imprimatur
64of the school. The Court remarked that in Tinker, the issue was
_% See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[W]here speech is in-
volved, we may not unquestioningly accept a teacher's or administrator's assertion
that certain pure speech interfered with education."); see also S. Elizabeth Wilborn,
Teaching the New Three Rs-Repression, Rights, and Respect: A Primer of Student Speech Ac-
tivities, 37 B.C. L. REv. 119, 131 (1995) (describing justice Burger's opinion as defer-
ring "without hesitation" to the school's "conclusory determination" that Fraser's
speech disrupted the school's educational activity).
57 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 12, at 628.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262-63 (1988). The princip-
al was also concerned that an individual who was the subject of a story on divorce was
not given an opportunity to respond. Id. at 263.
Id. at 266 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969)).
60 Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted).
61 Id. at 267 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 270.
64 Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270.
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whether the school was required to tolerate particular student
speech, whereas in this case the issue was whether a school is re-
quired to affirmatively "promote particular student speech., 65 Because
the school newspaper publication process was part of the school cur-
riculum, school officials were entitled to exercise greater control over
student speech in this context "to assure that participants learn what-
ever lessons the activity is designed to teach. 66 The Court held that
school officials may "exercis[e] editorial control over the style and
content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so
long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns."
67
Here, the Court reasoned that there were several reasons why
the principal was justified in removing the articles: to protect the con-
fidentiality of students and to protect younger students from inap-
propriate subject matter.! According to the Court, "[i] t is only when
the decision to censor a school-sponsored publication ... has no valid
educational purpose that the First Amendment is so directly and
sharply implicate [d] as to require judicial intervention to protect stu-
dents' constitutional rights.,
6
Since the Supreme Court decided Kuhlmeier, the decision has
been "invoked in a tremendous array of school speech cases."76 In
fact, not only have courts applied Kuhlmeier in the school speech con-
text, "but [they] have also relied on it in cases involving public
schools' textbook selections and curricular choices, teachers' in-class
speech, and even speech in a school setting by outside entities.,
71
More significantly, in the years after the Kuhlmeier decision, the Stu-
dent Press Law Center "identified a 'steady increase' in incidents of
censorship of the student press.
7 2
65 Id. at 270-71 (emphasis added).
66 Id. at 271.
67 Id. at 273.
6 Id. at 274-77.
69 Id. at 273 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
70 Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood's Core: A New Approach to Restric-
tions on School-Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 63-64 (2008).
7 Id. at 64 (citations omitted).
72 DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., THE SILENCING OF STUDENT VOICES: PRESERVING FREE
SPEECH IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 16 (2003) (noting that in 1988, the year Kuhlmeierwas
decided, the Student Press Law Center received about 588 requests for legal assis-
tance, while in 1999 it received over 1500 requests for legal assistance).
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D. Morse v. Frederick
In January 2002, Deborah Morse, the principal of Juneau-
Douglas High School (JDHS) in Juneau, Alaska, decided to allow staff
and students to participate in the Olympic Torch Relay, which was on
its way to Salt Lake City, Utah.13 Participation in the event was ap-
proved as a school-sanctioned social event or class trip.74 Joseph Fre-
derick, a senior atJDHS, arrived late to school due to car trouble and
joined his friends on the street to watch the relay.75 As the tor-
chbearer and camera crews approached, Frederick and his friends
outspread a fourteen-foot banner that bore the phrase "BONG HiTS
4JESUS."7 6 Principal Morse quickly demanded that the students take
down the banner." When only Frederick failed to comply, Morse
confiscated the banner and later suspended Frederick for ten days. 
78
Morse explained that the reason for the suspension was that she be-
lieved that the banner promoted illegal drug use, which constituted a
violation of a school policy that prohibited public expression that ad-
vocates the use of illicit substances. 79
Frederick filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Prin-
cipal Morse and the school board violated his First Amendment
rights.80 The United States District Court for the District of Alaska
determined Fraser, rather than Tinker, was applicable to Frederick's
speech.8' The court reasoned that, like Fraser, Frederick chose a spe-
cific forum at which to make his speech (the school-sanctioned
event) and that Frederick's speech constituted a statement of person-
al opinion contrary to the school's mission, whereas the speech in-
volved in Tinkerwas unrelated to the school's mission.82 Finding that
Morse was reasonable in interpreting the banner as advocating illegal
drug use, in violation of the school policy, the court granted summary
judgment in favor of Morse.83
73 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).
74 Id.; Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd, Morse v.
Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
75 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 2622-23.
so Frederick v. Morse, No. J 02-008 CV, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27270, at "1-2, *4
(D. Alaska May 27, 2003).81 Id. at* "18.
82 Id. at*18-19.
83 Id. at *20-21.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, apply-
ing Tinker, reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment.8 4
The court conceded that Frederick's speech occurred during a
school-authorized activity and that it expressed a positive sentiment
about marijuana; nevertheless, the court found a violation of Frede-
rick's First Amendment rights due to Morse's failure to demonstrate
that Frederick's speech was likely to substantially disrupt the school's
educational mission.
85
1. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, reversed the ap-
pellate court's decision and held that "the special characteristics of
the school environment" and the governmental interest in preventing
student drug use permit school officials to restrict student expression
that reasonably could be interpreted as encouraging illegal drug
use.86 The majority opinion, written by ChiefJustice Roberts, initial-
ly rejected Frederick's argument that this was not a school speech
case.88 The Chief Justice next explained that although the message
on Frederick's banner may have been "cryptic" or ambiguous, Prin-
cipal Morse believed that the banner could be interpreted as promot-
ing illegal drug use, and such an interpretation was "plainly a reason-
able one. 89 The issue thus became whether a school official may
restrict student speech at a school-sanctioned activity where the
84 Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1125 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 2618
(2007). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit read Fraser more
narrowly than the district court, finding that Fraser applies to speech of a sexual na-
ture. 439 F.3d at 1119. Although the court recognized that Frederick's banner may
have been "funny, stupid, or insulting," it was not "plainly offensive" as is sexual in-
nuendo. Id. The issue of confusion in regard to the proper application of Tinker
and its progeny is discussed in Part IV infra.
85 Id. at 1124.
86 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2621-22 (2007).
87 Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alitojoined the majority opinion. Id. at
2621.
88 Id. at 2624. Both lower courts and the appellate bodies of the Juneau School
Board also rejected this argument. Id.
89 Id. According to the majority, at least two interpretations of "BONG HiTS 4
JESUS" demonstrate that the phrase promoted illegal drug use. Id. at 2625. First,
the phrase could be interpreted as inhale "bong hits," a phrase equivalent to "smoke
marijuana" or "use an illegal drug." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Second,
the phrase could be interpreted as "bong hits [are a good thing]," or "[we take]
bong hits," which the Court deemed to be celebratory phrases that are not meaning-
fully distinguishable from express advocacy of illegal drug use. Id. Also, the Court
stated that Frederick's motive for displaying the banner-to get on television-was
irrelevant in interpreting what the banner said. Id.
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speech is reasonably interpreted as encouraging illegal drug use.9O
To resolve this issue, the Court began by discussing the Tinker trilogy.
Chief Justice Roberts first discussed Tinker's material and sub-
stantial disruption standard, and the Justice emphasized the political
nature of the speech involved in Tinker.91 Turning to Fraser, Justice
Roberts stated that the mode of analysis that the Fraser Court em-
ployed is not entirely evident,92 but the Fraser Court was "plainly at-
tuned to the content of Fraser's speech" and "also reasoned that
school boards have the authority to determine what manner of
speech in the classroom or in school assembly is appropriate. 9 3 The
Court then went on to distill two basic principles from Fraser (1) Fras-
er shows that "the constitutional rights of students in public school
are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings"; and (2) Tinkds mode of analysis is not absolute-that is, it
is not the only standard that can be employed to determine whether
particular speech may be prohibited in school. 94 The Court lastly dis-
cussed Kuhlmeier and noted that although Kuhlmeier is not applicable
here because Frederick's banner did not bear the imprimatur of the
school, Kuhlmeier did reaffirm Frasers basic principle that "schools
may regulate some speech even though the government could not
censor similar speech outside the school."99 Kuhlmeier, the Court ex-
plained, also confirms that Tinker's mode of analysis is not absolute. 9 6
The Court next observed that its Fourth Amendment cases in
the school context have applied the principles of the Court's student
speech cases. 97 Most notably, the idea that "the school setting re-
quires some easing" of constitutional protections, due to the "special
90 Id.
91 Id. at 2626 (noting that political speech is "at the core of what the First
Amendment is designed to protect") (internal quotation marks omitted). Here,
Chief Justice Roberts argued, Frederick's banner did not convey "any sort of political
or religious message." Id. at 2625 (stating additionally that "this is plainly not a case
about political debate over the criminalization of drug use or possession").
92 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626.
93 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Notably, Chief Justice Roberts quoted
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Fraser, in which Justice Brennan interpreted
the Fraser majority as not permitting viewpoint (or content-based) discrimination but,
rather, permitting the restriction of speech so that the school assembly could pro-
ceed in an orderly manner. Id. ChiefJustice Roberts explained that determining the
precise mode of analysis employed in Fraser was not necessary for the resolution of
Morse. Id.
94 Id. at 2626-27.
95 Id. at 2627 (internal quotation marks omitted).
96 Id.
97 Id.
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needs" of public schools, is prominent in these cases. 8 Furthermore,
the Fourth Amendment cases recognize that preventing drug use by
children is an "important[], perhaps compelling interest. 99
The Court then went on to discuss the deleterious effects of
drugs, especially on the developing mind of a child, and the extent of
the drug problem among school children.'00 Chief Justice Roberts al-
so noted the powerful effect of peer pressure in leading students to
take drugs and that school children are more likely to take drugs if
school norms convey the message that such behavior is tolerable. 0'
With these concerns in mind, the Court recognized that student
speech advocating drug use presents a particular challenge for school
officials. 10 2 The Court thus held that school officials may suppress
student speech encouraging illegal drug use because of "[t] he special
characteristics of the school environment" and the governmental in-
terest in preventing drug use.1'0 3 In so holding, the Court carved out
the third exception to Tinkds material and substantial disruption
standard-speech that can reasonably be interpreted as encouraging
illegal drug use.
Significantly, the majority rejected Morse's argument that Frede-
rick's speech is censorable because it is "plainly offensive" pursuant to
Fraser. °4 According to the Court, Fraser should not be read to sub-
sume all speech that falls within some definition of "offensive," be-
cause much religious and political speech could be deemed offen-
sive. 105
98 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2627 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Bd. of
Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829-30 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995); NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985)); see also infra
Part V.A.
99 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628 (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661).
10o Id. The Court noted that Congress has declared that part of a public school's
mission is to educate students about the harmful effects of illegal drug use. Id. Also,
the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1994 requires each school
to certify that the school's prevention programs "convey a clear and consistent mes-
sage that ... the illegal use of drugs (is] wrong and harmful." Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. §
7114(d) (6) (Supp. IV 2004)).
1 Id. at 2628 (citing Earls, 536 U.S. at 840).
102 Id.
I Id. at 2629 (internal quotation marks omitted). Chief Justice Roberts also ex-
plained that the prohibition of such speech is due to more than an "undifferentiated
fear or apprehension of disturbance" or "a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint." Id. (quoting Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)). As noted, Tinker
warned against prohibition of speech based on such fears or desires. See id.
104 Id. at 2629.
105 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629.
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2. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinions °0 6
Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion and wrote a concur-
ring opinion primarily to express his view that the Tinker standard has
no basis in the Constitution and should therefore be overruled.
10 7
Justice Thomas also expressed his dissatisfaction with the Court's stu-
dent speech jurisprudence, opining that it now says that "students
have a right to speak in schools except when they don't." s Accord-
ing to Justice Thomas, Frederick's speech could be prohibited for a
very simple reason: "As originally understood, the Constitution does
not afford students a right to free speech in public schools."'9
Justice Alito joined in the majority opinion on the understand-
ing that (1) the majority's holding is limited specifically to speech
that reasonably can be interpreted as advocating illegal drug use, and
(2) the majority's holding cannot be invoked to restrict speech that
comments on a political or social issue, such as speech regarding "the
wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal
use.""0  According to Justice Alito, the regulation of speech in this
case "stand[s] at the far reaches of what the First Amendment per-
mits.." Additionally, Justice Alito interpreted the majority opinion
as not endorsing the argument that school officials can censor speech
that interferes with the educational mission of the school."' Justice
Alito explained that such an argument could easily be used to incul-
cate the political and social views of the school's administration.
113
Furthermore, Justice Alito stated that the majority opinion should
not be read as stating that there are any other grounds for censorship
beyond those already recognized by Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and
Morse.114 Specifically, Justice Alito stated that
[i] n addition to Tinker, the decision in the present case allows the
restriction of speech advocating illegal drug use; [Fraser] permits
the regulation of speech that is delivered in a lewd or vulgar
106 Included here from the concurring and dissenting opinions are discussions of
only some of the highlights that are most relevant to the issues that are discussed
within this Comment.
107 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2630 (ThomasJ., concurring).
108 Id. at 2634. Though dissatisfied with the Court's jurisprudence, Justice Tho-
mas was content enough to join the majority's opinion "because it erode[d] Tinkers
hold in the realm of student speech." Id. at 2636.
109 Id. at 2634.
11 Id. at 2636 (Alito,J., concurring).
H] Id. at 2638.
"2 Id. at 2637.
113 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2637 (Alito,J., concurring).
114 Id.
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manner as part of a middle school program; and [Kuhlmeier] al-
lows a school to regulate what is in essence the school's own
speech." 5
Justice Alito's interpretation of the majority opinion is of considera-
ble importance and relevance considering thatJustice Alito's vote was
necessary to make ChiefJustice Roberts's opinion a majority opinion.
Justice Breyer, concurring in part and dissenting in part, would
have decided the case on the question of qualified immunity and
avoided the constitutional issue decided by the majority. 116 According
to Justice Breyer, the majority's holding endorses a viewpoint restric-
tion-prohibiting speech that encourages illicit drug use rather than
all speech concerning illicit drugs-and, thus, raises a number of
concerns. 117 For one, explained Justice Breyer, though the majority's
holding may facially appear to be limited to illegal drug use, it may
permit further viewpoint-based restrictions. 118 Justice Breyer was es-
pecially troubled about the possibility that political speech concern-
ing drug use may be suppressed pursuant to the majority's holding."9
Justice Breyer also expressed concern with the fact that the majority
did not offer any guidance as to how its holding should be applied. 1
2 0
The majority stated that school officials may "take steps" to "safe-
guard" students, but failed to explain what those steps may be.'2' Of-
feing some guidance, Justice Breyer explained, would help in pre-
venting overbroad interpretations of the majority's holding. 12
Justice Stevens, dissenting, agreed that Morse should not be held
liable for confiscating Frederick's banner, but the Justice would have
held that the school's interest in censoring speech encouraging drug
use did not justify disciplining Frederick for making an equivocal or
cryptic statement that happened to mention drugs. 12 Justice Stevens
115 Id. At least one court has already interpreted Justice Alito's concurrence as
"expressly stat[ing] that Morse leaves open the question of whether there are any oth-
er grounds for restricting speech beyond those recognized in Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier,
and now Morse." Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204 Bd. of Educ., No. 07 C
1586, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 94411, at *18 (N.D. Il. Dec. 21, 2007), rev'd, Nuxoll v. In-
dian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204 Bd. of Educ., 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008).
116 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638-39 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
117 Id. at 2639.
118 Id.
119 Id. (noting that "speech advocating change in drug laws might also be per-
ceived of as promoting the disregard of existing drug laws").
120 Id. at 2640.
121 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
12 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2640 (BreyerJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123 Id. at 2643 (StevensJ., dissenting).
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was especially critical of the majority for deciding the case based on a
constitutional issue and went so far as to say that "the Court [did] se-
rious violence to the First Amendment."'124 Justice Stevens's first ma-
jor concern was that the majority allowed the censorship of Frede-
rick's speech based on the content of the speech. 1 5 Justice Stevens
emphasized that the Court's jurisprudence requires that content-
based restrictions be scrutinized and "subject[ed] to the most rigor-
ous burden ofjustification."126 Nonetheless, Justice Stevens did admit
that it might be appropriate to allow some targeted viewpoint dis-
crimination in the school setting because of the school setting's spe-
cial characteristics. 
127
Justice Stevens next argued that even if some viewpoint restric-
tions may be tolerable in the school environment, Frederick's speech
did not, expressly or otherwise, advocate drug use. 128 Justice Stevens
also criticized the majority to the extent that it deferred to Morse's
interpretation of Frederick's speech rather than engaging in an in-
dependent examination. 12 9 According to Justice Stevens, the inter-
pretations of third parties, "reasonable or otherwise, have never dic-
tated which messages amount to proscribable advocacy."' 13° Lastly,
Justice Stevens explained that to the extent that Frederick's speech
was "cryptic" or ambiguous, the benefit of the doubt as to whether
the speech is proscribable advocacy should be resolved in favor of the
speaker. 131
124 Id. at 2643-51. According to Justice Stevens, "nationwide evaluations of the
conduct of the JDHS student body would have justified the principal's decision to
remove an attention-grabbing 14-foot banner, even if it had merely proclaimed
'Glaciers Melt!"' Id. at 2643.
125 Id. at 2644-45.
126 Id. at 2644 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 828-29 (1995)).
127 Id. at 2646.
128 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2646 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "it is one thing to
restrict speech that advocates drug use," but that "[i]t is another thing entirely to pro-
hibit an obscure message with a drug theme that a third party subjectively--and not
very reasonably-thinks is tantamount to express advocacy") (emphasis in original).
Justice Stevens also disagreed with the majority that the speaker's motive is irrelevant
to the determination of the meaning of speech-"a speaker who does not intend to
persuade his audience can hardly be said to be advocating anything." Id. at 2649.
19 Id. at 2647-48.
130 Id. at 2647.
131 Id. at 2649 (citing Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct.
2652, 2669, 2674 (2007)).
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III. SCHOOL SPEECH DOCTRINE AFTER MORSEAND MORSE APPLIED
The Supreme Court's decision in Morse has the potential to sig-
nificantly alter the state of school speech jurisprudence. The few cas-
es that have been decided after Morse show that as with Fraser and
Kuhlmeier before it, divergent interpretations of Morse are already
emerging from the handful of courts that have had to construe the
decision.
A. School Speech Doctrine after Morse
How does Morse change the landscape of school speech juri-
sprudence? Narrowly interpreted, Morse simply creates another con-
tent-based exception to Tinker for speech that can reasonably be in-
terpreted to promote illegal drug use. 3 As such, Morse continues the
trend of Fraser and Kuhlmeier by further shifting the balance in favor
of school authority. There are, however, a number of observations to
be made about the ways in which the Supreme Court's third excep-
tion to Tinker alters school speech jurisprudence and of equal impor-
tance, how it does not.
Perhaps most importantly, the exception carved out in Morse, un-
like the exceptions established in Fraser and Kuhlmeier, expands con-
tent-based restrictions beyond the realm of required curricular func-
tions. Unlike Fraser, which created a content-based exception in the
context of a school assembly, 33 and Kuhlmeier, which created a con-
tent-based exception in the context of a student newspaper, 34 Morse
created a content-based exception in the context of a non-curricular
activity."' Although attendance at the Torch Relay was permitted as a
"school-sanctioned" activity, this differs from an official activity that is
either organized by the school (and for which attendance is re-
quired) or bears the imprimatur of the school. 3 6 After Morse, one
132 Id. at 2629 (majority opinion).
133 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
13 484 U.S. 260, 272-73 (1988).
135 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622-23, 2629 (2007).
Id. at 2622. As Chemerinsky notes,
[i]t is appropriate to see [Fraser] and [Kuhlmeier], in their specific hold-
ings and their general approach, as being limited to public schools'
ability to regulate speech in official programs and courses. Therefore,
even in light of [Fraser] and [Kuhmeier], there remains First Amend-
ment protection of student speech in non-curricular areas where there
is no evidence of disruption of school activities.
Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 542. As discussed below, this so-called "appropriate"
interpretation of Fraser and Kuhlmeier has not been applied by all courts, many of
which have deemed that Fraser and Kuhlmeier apply outside of curricular activities. See
infra Part IV.B. Although one may argue that Chemerinsky's view is unduly narrow
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may argue that students have lost practically all of Tinker's protection
in the non-curricular setting, at least when the speech does not in-
volve a political message. However, this would only be true if one ac-
cepts the idea that Morse will be applied to speech other than that
which advocates illegal drug use.137 For example, in Doninger v. Nie-
hoff, 3 8 discussed in Part III.B, the court interpreted Morse as extend-
ing Fraser beyond the curricular activity context. 39 As per the Donin-
ger court's interpretation of Morse, school officials could censor
speech anywhere on a school's campus even if it does not cause a ma-
terial or substantial disruption if it can reasonably be interpreted as
advocating illegal drugs, if it is vulgar, obscene, or lewd, or perhaps
even if it is viewed as clearly disruptive of a particular educational
mission of the school.
40
Morse also marks the first time that the Court has restricted stu-
dent speech based on the viewpoint of the speaker. 14' This is rather
and the courts that broadly apply these cases are correct, both the Kuhlmeier and Fras-
er Courts emphasized the importance of context in school speech analysis. See Kuhl-
meier, 484 U.S. at 262, 266, 270-72; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681, 685. Indeed, each decision
was based primarily on the context in which the speech was uttered. See Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. at 260, 262, 266, 270-72; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681, 685. Significantly, the
Kuhlmeier Court, in laying the groundwork for its analysis, first explained that stu-
dents
cannot be punished merely for expressing their personal views on the
school premises-whether in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or
on the campus during the authorized hours-unless school authorities
have reason to believe that such expression will substantially interfere
with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other stu-
dents.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court therefore distinguished between what standard should be applied to speech
uttered during curricular activities, such as school assemblies and publishing a school
newspaper, and speech uttered at other times or in other contexts. Id.
137 Notably, while some courts have applied Morse to speech other than that which
promotes drug use, other courts have interpreted Morse narrowly. Compare Boim v.
Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 984 (11th Cir. 2007) (determining that
Morse's holding supports restricting student speech reasonably interpreted as a threat
of school violence), with DePinto v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 514 F. Supp. 2d 633, 638-
40 (D.N.J. 2007) (interpreting Morse as applicable solely to speech that promotes il-
legal drug activity).
514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007).
139 Id. at 213.
140 Id.
141 See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2639 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); id. at 2644-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Hans
Bader, BONG HiTS 4JESUS: The First Amendment Takes a Hit, 2006-07 CATO Sup. CT.
REv. 133, 142-45 (2007).
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significant, and troubling to some,14 because viewpoint discrimina-
tion is usually viewed as a blatant violation of First Amendment
rights. 143 Indeed, viewpoint discrimination has been characterized as
an "egregious form of content discrimination."' 44 Nevertheless, as Jus-
tice Stevens noted, the special nature of the school environment may
allow for some targeted viewpoint restrictions. 14
Morse also continues the trend of Fraser and Kuhlmeier (as well as
other Supreme Court decisions concerning the constitutional rights
of students) by providing to school officials an ever-increasing
amount of discretion in deciding what speech should be restricted
and how particular speech should be interpreted.146 With respect to
interpretation, Justice Stevens argued that to the extent that certain
speech is ambiguous, "when it comes to defining what speech quali-
fies as the functional equivalent of express advocacy ... we give the
benefit of the doubt to speech, not censorship."'147 In Morse, the ma-
jority gave the benefit of the doubt to the censor, reasoning that
Morse's interpretation that Frederick's banner advocated drug use
was just as plausible as Frederick's explanation that the banner was
meaningless. 148 The case cited for the proposition that the tie should
go to the speaker, Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life,
Inc., 49 concerned "adult" speech, and thus may not apply in the stu-
dent speech context.5 0 Nevertheless, at least one court (in a case de-
cided after Morse) has cited Wisconsin Right to Life for this exact propo-
sition in the student speech context,'' leaving the possibility that the
142 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2639 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 2644-45 (StevensJ, dissenting); Bader, supra note 141, at 142-45.
"43 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829
(1995) (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S 377, 391 (1992)). The Court
in Rosenberger explained that "[t] he government must abstain from regulating speech
when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is
the rationale for the restriction." Id. at 829.
144 Id. (emphasis added).
145 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2646 (StevensJ., dissenting).
146 See id. at 2647-49.
147 Id. at 2649 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S.
Ct. 2652, 2669, 2674 (2007)).
148 Id. at 2624-25 (majority opinion). The majority acknowledged that
"[g]ibberish is surely a possible interpretation" of Frederick's banner; however, such
an interpretation would ignore the banner's "undeniable reference to illegal drugs."
Id. at 2625. The majority did not state "reference to using illegal drugs," and inter-
preted the banner as such only by reasoning that the banner can be interpreted in
this way if the word "take" or the words "we take" are assumed by the listener. Id.
4 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
150 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151 Bowler v. Town of Hudson, 514 F. Supp. 2d 168, 177 (D. Mass. 2007).
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majority opinion can be interpreted as not necessarily disposing of
this principle in the school context. If the benefit of the doubt does
indeed go to school officials, the Court may have opened the door to
greater suppression of student speech, because borderline or ambi-
guous speech may be readily suppressed. With such a possibility
comes the specter of the chilling effect and reluctance on the part of
students to exercise their First Amendment rights. 152
Finally, the Morse decision failed to provide adequate guidance
to lower courts as to when and how the Tinker trilogy should be ap-
plied. 153 The majority essentially stated the obvious by explaining that
Fraser established that the mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not
absolute, but that the mode utilized in Fraser is not entirely clear. 1
54
The Court did limit Fraser by explaining that restricting speech simply
because it is "offensive" would be stretching Fraser too far. 5 Many
questions, however, remain unanswered, such as whether speech can
be suppressed pursuant to a school policy when such speech is nei-
ther lewd, sexually explicit, nor advocative of illegal drug use. In
other words, can a school censor speech that is against a particular
educational mission embodied in a school policy? 56 Thus, confusion
remains as to when, where, and how the now "quartet"'5 7 of student
speech cases is to be applied.
152 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 287-88 (1988) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
153 For other observations and criticisms with respect to the Morse opinion, see
Bader, supra note 141, at 141-65; see generally Brannon P. Denning & Molly C. Taylor,
Morse v. Frederick and the Regulation of Student Cyberspeech, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
835 (2008); Melinda Cupps Dickler, The Morse Quartet: Student Speech and the First
Amendment, 53 LOY. L. REv. 355 (2007).
154 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626.
155 Id. at 2629.
156 For example, in Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie School District No. 204 Board of Educa-
tion, No. 07 C 1586, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94411 (N.D. 111. Dec. 21, 2007), the court
declined to issue a preliminary injunction to permit a student to wear a t-shirt with
the phrase "Be Happy, Not Gay," because the phrase was against the school's educa-
tional mission of promoting tolerance. According to the Zamecnik court, "Morse is
not powerfully convincing precedent that the Seventh Circuit would not continue to
allow public schools to take into consideration pedagogical concerns and the
school's basic educational mission when restricting student speech." Id. at *19. Cas-
es such as Zamecnik show that school officials can rather easily characterize what is
essentially "offensive" speech as being contrary to a particular educational mission of
the school. On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed the district court's decision. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No.
204 Bd. of Educ., 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008). In Nuxoll, the court characterized the
phrase "Be Happy, Not Gay" as "only tepidly negative," and applying Tinker decided
that it was highly speculative whether this statement would cause a substantial disrup-
tion. Id. at 676.
157 See Dickler, supra note 153, at 362.
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In sum, Morse has the potential to be more than simply a drug
exception. Morse's holding is certainly narrow on its face, and Justice
Alito's concurrence argues that it should be interpreted narrowly.' 58
A similar observation can be made about Fraser's holding and Justice
Brennan's concurrence, which advocated a narrow interpretation;1 5 9
however, Fraser has not been interpreted narrowly by all courts. Non-
etheless, one may distinguish these two cases by pointing to the fact
that Justice Alito's vote was necessary for the result in Morse, whereas
Justice Brennan's vote was not necessary for the result in Fraser. Be-
cause Justice Alito's vote was determinative, his interpretation should
be adhered to more strictly.'" Part III.B discusses a number of deci-
sions that have applied Morse and thus gives a glimpse as to the effect
Morse is having and possibly will have in the future.
B. Morse Applied
A number of student speech cases have been decided since the
Supreme Court's decision in Morse. These decisions have applied
Morse both narrowly and broadly to various types of speech.
At least two courts have dealt with the issue of speech that can be
interpreted as threatening school violence. Boim v. Fulton County
School District,' decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, concerned a student who wrote a passage in her
notebook about a dream in which she killed her math teacher.' 62 A
158 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636-38 (Alito,J., concurring).
159 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 687-90 (1986) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
160 According to the Marks rule, "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and
no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five justices, the holding
of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred
in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188,
193 (1977) (quotation and citation omitted). Although the Marks rule has only been
applied to plurality decisions, its reasoning can be viewed as instructive with respect
to five-to-four decisions, especially when a Justice or Justices join a majority opinion
conditionally as in Morse. IfJustice Alito had not joined the majority, he would have
concurred in the Court's judgment on the narrowest grounds. Because Justice Alito
joined the majority on the understanding that the Court's holding was narrow, see
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2636 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring), it should be
assumed that if the Court's holding was actually broader, Justice Alito would not have
joined the majority, and "no single rationale explaining the result" would have en-
joyed the assent of fivejustices. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193. Thus, because Justice Alito's
decision to join the majority was conditional and because his is the most narrow opi-
nion, it should be viewed as controlling, or at the least, strongly persuasive. Contra
Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204 Bd. of Educ., 523 F.3d 668, 672-73 (7th
Cir. 2008).
161 494 F.3d 978 (11th Cir. 2007).
162 Id. at 980-81.
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fellow student was viewing a different entry in the notebook, and a
teacher confiscated it after several requests to put the notebook
away. 163 The teacher later noticed the entry, and the student was sus-
pended due to concerns that the notebook entry was "planning in
disguise as a dream."'64 The Boim court first concluded that the stu-
dent's actions in writing the passage and giving her notebook to
another student "clearly caused and was reasonably likely to further
cause a material and substantial disruption to the 'maintenance of
order and decorum' within [the school]. ' '"65 Although the court ap-
parently found the speech proscribable under Tinker, the court went
on to discuss Morse, and after quoting Morse's holding, the court con-
cluded that the "same rationale applies equally, if not more strongly,
to speech reasonably construed as a threat of school violence."16  The
court thus expanded Morse's reasoning to the realm of speech rea-
sonably interpreted as threatening school violence. Regardless of
whether one agrees that this is a reasonable expansion of Morse, this
case demonstrates that Morse may not be applied as narrowly as Jus-
tice Alito argued it should be.
Another post-Morse case concerning speech interpreted as
threatening school violence, Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weeds-
port Central School District,167 dealt with a student who was suspended
for sharing with friends, over the Internet, a small drawing that sug-
gested that a named teacher should be killed."" The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the lower court's
dismissal of the case and held that the speech was proscribable under
Tinker.16 9 In DePinto v. Bayonne Board of Education,70 which involved
students who were suspended for wearing buttons that featured a
photograph of members of the Hitler Youth to protest the school's
mandatory uniform policy, the court interpreted Morse as applicable
solely to speech that mentions, alludes to, or refers to illegal drug ac-
tivity.' 7' The DePinto court was attuned to the fact that the Morse ma-
jority emphasized that prior students' rights cases recognized the im-
portance of deterring drug use by schoolchildren.12  Thus, not all
163 Id. at 980.
164 Id. at 981.
165 Id. at 983.
1' Id. at 984.
167 494 F,3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
16 Id. at 36.
169 Id. at 35.
1-0 514 F. Supp. 2d 633 (D.N.J. 2007).
171 Id. at 640.
172 Id.
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courts are willing to expand Morse to prohibit speech other than that
which encourages illegal drug use.
In addition to Boim v. Fulton County School District, another case
that interpreted Morse broadly, Doninger v. Niehoff 13 concerned a stu-
dent who was prohibited from participating in an extracurricular ac-
tivity after she posted a vulgar message criticizing school officials on a
social networking website.'7 4 The Doninger court interpreted Morse as
"extend[ing] Fraser to cover on-campus speech that school adminis-
trators could reasonably interpret as advocating the use of drugs, a
message clearly disruptive of and inconsistent with the school's mis-
sion to educate students about the dangers of illegal drugs and to dis-
courage their use."'7 5 The court also stated that "Fraser and Morse
teach that school officials could permissibly punish [a student for
posting offensive speech on a blog], which interfered with the
school's highly appropriate function ... to prohibit the use of vulgar
and offensive terms in public discourse." 176 The court found this in-
terpretation of Morse applicable only to the particular circumstances
of the case, where the punishment imposed was prohibiting a student
from participating in an extracurricular activity.' 77 Thus, although
Doninger takes a broader view of Morse, potentially applying it to pro-
hibit vulgar and offensive speech outside the context of the school's
curriculum, it takes this broader view only under the particular fac-
tual circumstances of the student's actions and the punishment im-
posed.
As the above cases show, courts have already taken divergent ap-
proaches with respect to the breadth of Morse's holding. Some courts
have interpreted Morse narrowly as applying only to speech promot-
ing illegal drug use, while other courts have expanded Morse beyond
its holding to speech purportedly threatening school violence and
vulgar or offensive speech, posted on a blog, critical of faculty or ad-
ministrators.
173 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007), affd, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008). Whe-
reas the district court decided this case under Fraser and Morse, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the decision under Tinker. Doninger
v. Niehoff 527 F.3d 41, 48-53 (2d Cir. 2008).
174 Id.
175 Id. at 213 (internal quotations omitted).
176 Id. at 217 (internal citations and quotations omitted). According to the court,
under Second Circuit precedent, the student's blog entry could be considered on-
campus speech for purposes of the First Amendment. Id.
Id. ("[T]his Court would be reluctant to find no First Amendment violation in
other factual contexts or if the discipline imposed on Avery, [the student], were dif-
ferent.").
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IV. GREATER DISCRETION AND GREATER CONFUSION
A. Greater Discretion
As previously noted, courts have accorded greater discretion to
school officials in both the free speech context and in the context of
privacy and procedural due process rights. On the one hand, school
officials have more power to control the educational environment.
For example, Anne P. Dupre, a former public school teacher and
currently a professor of law at the University of Georgia School of
Law, argues that Tinker "paved the way for the decline in school order
and educational quality," and the Supreme Court's decisions con-
cerning school authority since Tinker, allowing greater authority to
school officials, are a step in the right direction.1 78 On the other
hand, according greater discretion to school officials may have a
chilling effect on the exercise of students' free speech rights. 179 It is
true that the chilling effect may also affect teachers and school offi-
cials if they are not accorded sufficient discretion;1 80 however, accord-
ing teachers and school officials greater discretion, or granting them
qualified immunity in certain situations, may alleviate this concern.181
In addition, increasing censorship of student speech, especially when
it is not truly disruptive or harmful, runs counter to the role of public
schools to teach the "values and responsibilities of United States citi-
zenship."'
81
Although the Supreme Court did not decide another school
speech case until seventeen years after Tinker, the Court decided a
number of important cases regarding student rights in the interven-
ing years. In 1975, the Court decided Goss v. Lopez, in which it held
that before a public school could suspend a student, it must give the
178 Dupre, supra note 2, at 99-104.
179 Specifically, as this Comment argues in this Part and Part V.A, the accordance
of great deference to school officials may often permit the suppression of speech
found subjectively disagreeable, either due to ideology or overreaction, when it is
otherwise constitutionally protected.
180 In other words, if a teacher or school official is unsure whether or not certain
speech can lawfully be restricted, she may be hesitant to suppress such speech know-
ing she may be subject to liability.
181 For example, if a quick decision as to whether or not to suppress speech needs
to be made, it may be appropriate to grant a school official qualified immunity.
Granting qualified immunity in these types of situations, among others, will allow
teachers to maintain order without the concern that they may be subject to personal
liability.
12 Hudson & Ferguson, supra note 12, at 181.
183 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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student notice of the suspension as well as an informal hearing. 84
Suspending a student without notice or a hearing would thus be a vi-
olation of the student's right to procedural due process.185 As in
Tinker, the Court in Goss did not accord students the same constitu-
tional rights as adults, but was student-rights friendly-that is, it em-
phasized the fact that public schools must exercise their authority
consistently with the requirements of the Constitution.""6
Two years later, in Ingraham v. Wright,187 the Court held that the
Eighth Amendment did not apply to disciplinary corporal punish-
ment (paddling) in public schools, and public schools did not have to
provide due process prior to the imposition of such punishment.88
According to the Court, the limitations on corporal punishment in
public schools under common law and state tort law remedies were
sufficient for the protection of students' rights.8 9 In addition, the
Court stated that determining the appropriateness of school discip-
line "is committed ... to the discretion of school authorities subject
to state law."'9 °
In the Fourth Amendment context, the Court decided New Jersey
v. T.L.O.,' 9' in which it held that reasonable suspicion, rather than
probable cause, is sufficient to justify a search of a student and her
belongings in a public school. 19 2 The Court justified this relaxed
standard in part on the increase in drug use and violent crime in
schools, which had made maintaining order in the classroom diffi-
cult. 193 Thus, the interest of teachers and administrators in maintain-
ing order and discipline prevailed over the student's interest in priva-
194
cy.
Finally, in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 195 also a Fourth
Amendment decision, the Supreme Court held that a policy requir-
ing suspicionless drug testing for student athletes was constitution-
al. 196 The Court pointed to essentially all the major student rights
184 Id. at 582-83.
185 Id. at 583.
186 Id. at 574.
187 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
188 Id. at 682-83.
189 Id. at 677-83.
190 Id. at 682.
191 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
192 Id. at 341.
193 Id. at 339.
194 Id.
195 515 U.S. 646 (1995). Vernonia was decided after Fraser and Kuhlmeier.
196 Id. at 664-65.
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cases discussed above and once again reaffirmed that "the nature [of
students' constitutional rights] is what is appropriate for children in
school."1 97 Also, the Court noted the important interest of deterring
drug use among student athletes, and compared student athletes to
adults working in "closely regulated industr[ies]" who have a lower
expectation of privacy.198 In Board of Education v. Earls,'9 however,
Justice Thomas argued that the student athletes' lower expectation of
privacy was not essential to the decision in Vernonia; rather, the deci-
sion "depended primarily upon the school's custodial responsibility
and authority.,
20 0
Perhaps not surprisingly, the various student rights cases have
become intertwined, at least with respect to notions of the limited na-
ture of students' constitutional rights and how deferential courts
ought to be to school officials. In other words, principles adopted by
the Supreme Court in one context-free speech rights, for exam-
ple-have been readily transplanted to cases concerning privacy and
procedural due process rights, and vice versa. Goss began the intert-
winement by citing and quoting Tinker .201 The intertwinement con-
tinued with the Court citing and quoting its various speech, privacy,
and procedural due process cases primarily for the propositions that
the rights of students are not coextensive with those of adults and
that the rights of students are what is appropriate in the school envi-
ronment.2 0 2 With the apparent increase in student drug use and
school violence, the courts have accorded increasing discretion to
school officials, so that they can maintain order and decorum in the
nation's schools. The Supreme Court has not, however, differen-
tiated between the importance of speech, privacy, and procedural
due process rights, and how or to what degree the limitation of each
may contribute to the maintenance of order in public schools. Thus,
what may have initially been a recognition of the need for more dis-
cretion in the Fourth Amendment and student drug use context (New
Jersey v. T.L.O.) was later readily acknowledged by the Court in the
First Amendment context (Fraser and Kuhlmeier) .03
197 Id. at 655-57.
'9 Id. at 657.
199 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
200 Id. at 831.
201 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
M See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655-56; Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260, 266 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682, 686 (1986);
NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336, 339-40 (1985); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 681-82 (1977).
203 See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682, 686.
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The comparatively equal discretion that is accorded to school of-
ficials in each context may need to be reconsidered. Although a
good deal of discretion may be required in the Fourth Amendment
context, considering the imminent nature of the threat when a stu-
dent is possibly in possession of a harmful substance or weapon, the
same sort of threat or harm is not involved in the First Amendment
context, at least when the type of speech at issue is not that which
causes or may cause a material and substantial disruption. As dis-
cussed in Parts V and VI, the free expression context involves differ-
ent interests and consequences that may caution against according
too much discretion to school officials.
The need to treat students' free speech, privacy, and procedural
due process rights differently is in part illustrated by Kay Hymowitz in
"Tinker and the Lessons from the Slippery Slope," in which she de-
scribes a number of situations where teachers refrained from taking
disciplinary action against students. 0 4 Significantly, the reasons given
for not taking any disciplinary action relate to evidentiary issues, such
as not having any witnesses to counter a student's possible "other side
of the story,, 205 and not because the teacher was unsure whether par-
ticular speech could be censored. In such situations, perhaps what is
needed is not greater discretion to silence speech, but an easing of
evidentiary requirements-for example, eliminating the requirement
of corroboration (in schools that have such a requirement). The
blame placed on Tinker for such things as increasing verbal abuse2 r
and other disobedience 2 7 may in many cases be misplaced. These
types of disruptive speech are what Tinker does not permit. It simply
does not follow that increased disorder in schools and reluctance
among teachers to discipline necessarily requires the accordance of
more discretion to teachers or the curtailment of student speech
rights. Rather, teachers and school officials should come to under-
stand that Tinker and its progeny do not leave them powerless. Simi-
larly, courts may need to reconsider whether the curtailment of free
speech rights actually has a substantial enough effect on the allevia-
tion of these problems to justify the curtailment of a fundamental
righ t. 2
08
204 Hymowitz, supra note 42, at 555-56. Hymowitz describes these incidents under
the heading of "Tinker's Aftermath," arguing that Tinker has played a role in increas-
ing disobedience in schools. Id. She argues that "empowering children with rights
inevitably began the deconstruction and disempowerment of the teacher." Id. at 555.
205 Id. (internal citation and quotations omitted).
2W Id. at 562-63.
207 See id. at 555-58; Dupre, supra note 2, at 50-51.
M See infra notes 223-28 and accompanying text.
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The issue of whether significant discretion should be accorded
to school officials also requires the consideration of the concept of
moral panic. Throughout the history of the United States, albeit out-
side the school context, and primarily in times of war, fundamental
rights have been curtailed in the name of security.2"' Too often,
hindsight has shown that curtailment of civil liberties was an over-
reaction .20 Although there is no doubt that adolescent drug use and
school violence are serious problems in schools, such problems must
be dealt with in a constructive and effective manner, without losing
sight of the utmost importance of the First Amendment in the face of
fear and panic.
Stanley Cohen coined the concept of moral panic to character-
ize "the reactions of the media, the public, and agents of social con-
trol to youth disturbances. ''1 ' Moral panics typically involve concern
and hostility over the behavior of a group or category of people.1
The disturbance or perceived threat to the existing social order is
amplified by the media, which depicts events as a sign of widespread
moral anxiety and social disintegration. 3 According to Donna Kil-
lingbeck, "[t] he response [to such events] is likely to be a demand for
200 See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME
(2004).
210 Id. at 528-29. It is true that such a criticism is easy to make after the fact-that
is, hindsight is 20/20. Nevertheless, such an observation does not change the fact
that the curtailment of civil liberties throughout various points in history was indeed
an overreaction, and therefore unnecessary. Though it is much more difficult to
look forward and determine whether a certain measure is truly an overreaction to a
problem, the main objective here is to emphasize the need for judges to be cognizant
of the propensity of educators and administrators to overreact in the face of a moral
panic and closely scrutinize their decisions to suppress speech in such circumstances.
21 Donna Killingbeck, The Role of Television News in the Construction of School Violence
as a "Moral Panic,"8 J. CRIM. JUST. & POPULAR CULTuRE 186, 187 (2001), available at
http://www.albany.edu/scj/jcjpc/vol8is3/killingbeck.pdf, see also ERICH GOODE &
NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, MORAL PANICS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DEVIANCE 11-
12 (1994).
The key elements or stages of a moral panic are:
1. Someone or something is defined as a threat to values or in-
terests;
2. This threat is depicted in an easily recognizable form by the
media;
3. There is a rapid build up of public concern;
4. There is a response from authorities or opinion makers;
5. The panic recedes or results in social changes.
Killingbeck, supra, at 187.
212 Killingbeck, supra note 211, at 188.
213 Id.
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greater social regulation or control and a demand for a return to tra-
ditional values.0
1 4
Killingbeck argues that the media generated a moral panic after
the Columbine school shootings."5 Killingbeck writes that the media
labeled school shootings as "a trend" and thus exacerbated the fears
of the public about the safety of students in school.116 The result of
such fear is a misdirected public policy that attempts to safeguard
schools, even though the root of the problem may lie elsewhere. 2"7
School officials and judges are not immune from the effects of moral
panics. Clay Calvert notes that after Columbine many school admin-
istrators are interpreting what is otherwise harmless speech-for ex-
ample, stories, poems, and other artwork-as true threats.2 8 Also,
the majority opinion in Boim v. Fulton County School District relied
upon a number of media reports, rather than statistics, to demon-
strate the extent of the problem of school violence.1 9
Scholars and commentators alike have observed that moral pan-
ics have been generated with respect to the drug problem in the
United States. 20 Although each of these authors does not discuss
drug use among youth specifically, Professor Yuet W. Cheung notes
that public belief in an ever-increasing problem of illicit drug use
"has fuelled the prohibitionist reaction to drug use."22' Among the
criticisms of the prohibitionist approach is that it infringes the civil
222
rights of citizens.
The point here is not that drugs or violence are not problems
within schools. Instead, school officials, judges, and policy-makers
must be cognizant of the possible effects of moral panics, especially
when fundamental rights are at stake. For example, some amicus
214 Id.
215 See id. at 186.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Public Schools in a Post-Columbine World: Check Your
Speech Rights at the Schoolhouse Metal Detector, 77 DENV. U. L. REv. 739, 760 (2000).
219 Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 983-84 (11th Cir. 2007); see
also Lavine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 984 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2001).
22 See GOODE & BEN-YEHUDA, supra note 211, at 205-23; Yuet W. Cheung, Sub-
stance Abuse and Developments in Harm Reduction, 162 CAN. MED. Assoc.J. 1697 (2000),
available at http://www.cmaj.ca/cgi/reprint/162/12/1697; Jack Shafer, The Meth-
Mouth Myth, Our Latest Moral Panic, SLATE, Aug. 9, 2005, http://www.slate.com/
id/2124160/ (noting that "in the United States, moral panics are most reliably di-
rected at illicit drug users"); see also Peter J. Venturelli, Drugs in Schools: Myths and
Realities, 567 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCi. 72, 76-78 (2000).
22 Cheung, supra note 220, at 1697-99.
Id.
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briefs submitted to the Supreme Court in Morse argued that allowing
speech such as Frederick's would undermine the ability of schools to
protect their students from drug abuse. 22 The amici further claimed
that the susceptibility of students to such messages is evidenced by the
fact that over half of American secondary school students have tried
illegal drugs. 24 Other amici, however, pointed out that no evidence
was offered to support the claim that silencing student speech is ne-
cessary or even helpful in preventing student drug use.2  In addi-
tion, still other amici noted that "First Amendment doctrine already
recognizes that some government interests are compelling enough to
suppress speech.2 2 6 But it also recognizes that claims of necessity will
frequently be advanced.2 7 Consequently, so that the benefits of free
expression may be protected, the First Amendment "requires that
those claiming compelling interests show that the repressive means
will make a substantial difference." 28  Lastly, Hans Bader of the
Competitive Enterprise Institute notes that the Court restricted
speech that was unlikely to cause drug use "in its zeal to give the gov-
ernment a win in the 'War on Drugs.'"229
Whether it is because of zeal or fear, in many circumstances
there may be a rush to judgment that certain speech should be si-
lenced due to its deleterious effects. Furthermore, it is unclear
whether suppression of speech may have any substantial beneficial ef-
fects. In light of this, courts should consider granting less deference
to school officials in many circumstances because otherwise harmless
speech may be silenced. Such circumstances include where a court
has reason to believe that speech is being censored simply because it
is contrary to traditional (or a teacher's or administrator's personal)
moral, cultural, religious, or political values, or where it appears that
23 Brief for D.A.R.E. America et a]. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1,
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278), 2007 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 27.
224 Id.
225 Brief for Students for Sensible Drug Policy as Amicus Curiae Supporting Res-
pondent at 10, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278), 2007 U.S. S.
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 223.
226 Brief for Drug Policy Alliance et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
54, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278), 2007 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 156.
227 Id.
28 Id. Even if "substantial difference" is too demanding a standard, proof of some
sort of demonstrable difference ought to be required to protect against overzealous-
ness and otherwise pretextual justifications for speech suppression.
M Bader, supra note 141, at 133.
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there may have been a rush to judgment.23 Admittedly, there will be
cases that require a quick decision as to whether to censor certain
speech (Morse itself being a good example). In these situations it may
be appropriate to defer to the decision of a teacher or administrator.
But, declining to find a teacher or administrator liable due to a split-
second decision to censor speech should not necessarily foreclose the
possibility of an equitable remedy, such as the expungement of a stu-
dent's disciplinary record.23!
Continuance of the trend of giving school officials more discre-
tion and deference ultimately leads to the suppression of speech that
is otherwise permissible under the Supreme Court's school speech
jurisprudence. This trend toward greater suppression includes
speech beyond the context of speech related to school violence and
illicit drugs. One such example of seemingly harmless and unobjec-
tionable speech being silenced is Broussard v. School Board of the City of
Norfolk.232 There, a student was suspended for wearing a t-shirt with
the phrase "Drugs Suck!" because school administrators deemed that
the word "suck" was offensive.233 The Broussard court found no First
Amendment violation because the word "suck" in the context of the
student's shirt could be interpreted as lewd, vulgar, or offensive.3
Indeed, as noted by Wilborn, "courts have become very deferential to
suppression of student speech by school authorities who can offer any
reason for their action that is related to some pedagogical objective,
however fanciful.
2 35
Greater deference is also problematic in light of the fact that the
response to a moral panic is "likely to be a demand for greater social
regulation or control and a demand for a return to traditional val-
ues."26 Greater social regulation and demand for a return to tradi-
230 Although it is true that one of the functions of schools is to pass on moral, cul-
tural, and political values, it is not true that schools ought to be silencing speech con-
trary to traditional values, especially when a student is speaking outside of class or is
otherwise not directly interfering with the school's work in educating its students. See
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988).
231 See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2638-39 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2643 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In fact, the deci-
sion of a school official can be deferred to, or qualified immunity can be granted to
protect the school official from personal liability, while leaving the student with the
possibility of obtaining an equitable remedy. See id.
232 801 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Va. 1992).
233 Id. at 1528.
23 Id. at 1537.
23 Wilborn, supra note 56, at 139 (noting also that increased deference to school
officials leaves open a "black hole" into which school officials may toss any speech
thedislike or with which they disagree).
Killingbeck, supra note 211, at 187.
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tional values raises the concern of the Barnette Court-that public
schools may go beyond inculcating core democratic values to poten-
tially indoctrinating children. 7 The concern is thus not simply that
there may be overregulation of student speech, but that overregula-
tion may be employed selectively so that certain moral or political
values are emphasized while others are completely excluded. Such a
possibility should not be forgotten or ignored by the courts lest the
nation's children become "closed-circuit recipients of only that which
the State chooses to communicate.
2 38
B. Greater Confusion
After the Supreme Court's decisions in Fraser and Kuhlmeier, nu-
merous commentators lamented the inconsistent application of these
decisions by the lower courts. 30 Indeed, lower courts themselves have
found school speech jurisprudence unclear and difficult to apply.240
The Court's decision in Morse did not do much to clear up any of the
confusion. On the one hand, Morse did limit Fraser by stating that the
holding in Fraser cannot be stretched to restrict simply "offensive"
speech.4  On the other hand, the Court implicitly opened the gates
for further content-based restrictions by emphasizing that Fraser and
Kuhlmeier established that Tinker is not the only standard that may be
utilized to restrict speech. Also, although some courts have restricted
speech in part because it was deemed offensive, other courts have
taken different approaches that were not addressed by Morse.
27 See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
23 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969); see also
Solove, supra note 25, at 960-70 (arguing that the bureaucratic state impedes indi-
vidual self-definition and that increasing judicial deference effectively shuts judicial
review-"which history has demonstrated can be a powerful tool for the furtherance
of liberal values"-out of the bureaucratic state).
229 See Brief for Appellant-Petitioner at 71-72, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618
(2007) (No. 06-278), 2007 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 18 ("Not only are the voices la-
menting confusion and doubt infecting the fractious body of school speech law nu-
merous, they are robustly and ideologically diverse."); Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at
541-46; Hudson & Ferguson, supra note 12; Miller, supra note 12, at 646-50; Justin T.
Peterson, Comment, School Authority v. Students' First Amendment Rights: Is Subjectivity
Strangling the Free Mind at Its Source?, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REv. 931, 939-47 (2005).
240 See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2641 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 737 (7th
Cir. 1994).
241 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629. Thus, cases such as Boroff v. Van Wert City Board of
Education, 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding the suppression of a Marilyn Man-
son t-shirt that mocked a religious figure constitutional because of the t-shirt's offen-
sive nature) may be implicitly overruled.
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For example, in discussing the trend that lower court decisions
are increasingly more in agreement with Justice Black's dissent in
Tinker (which advocated for great deference to school officials) ,242
Chemerinsky notes Poling v. Murphy,W decided by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In Poling, a student was discip-
lined for making rude and discourteous comments about the school
administration in a nomination speech delivered during a school-
sponsored assembly. 44 In affirming the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment, the court concluded that the student's speech during
the assembly fell within the meaning of Kuhlmeier, and thus applied
Kuhlmeier's rational basis standard, determining that school officials
had legitimate pedagogical concerns to discipline the student.2 4' The
issue with Poling is whether such an expansion of Kuhlmeier to speech
not bearing the imprimatur of the school is permissible. According
to Chemerinsky, Poling's approach-rational basis review and defe-
rence to school authorities-is representative of the majority of lower
court school speech decisions since Tinker.24"
Questions remain not only about the boundaries of Kuhlmeier
but also with respect to Fraser. For example, in Boroff v. Van Wert City
Board of Education,47 which held constitutional the suppression of a
Marilyn Manson t-shirt that mocked a religious figure, the court
noted that the speech was both offensive and against the school's
educational mission.2 4' Thus, how far may a school go in silencing
speech that it deems contrary to its educational mission? This ques-
tion may very well be asked with respect to Morse, because the Court's
holding is based in part on the notion that speech advocating illegal
drug use is counter to the educational mission of schools. 249  Fur-
thermore, what are the limits to speech that is lewd and indecent?
242 Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 544.
243 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989).
244 Id. at 758. The "rude" and "discourteous" remarks included: "The administra-
tion plays tricks with your mind and they hope you won't notice.... If you want to
break the iron grip of this school, vote for me. . ..." Id. at 759.
24- Id. at 763-64.
246 Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 545.
247 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000).
248 Id. at 469-70. The confusion among lower courts in applying the Tinker trilogy
is further illustrated by comparing Boroff with Nixon v. Northern Local School District
Board of Education, 383 F. Supp. 2d 965 (S.D. Ohio 2005), which involved facts very
similar to those in Boroff, but reached the opposite result. The Nixon court opined
that "[r]ather than being concerned with the actual content of what is being con-
veyed, the Fraserjustification for regulating speech is more concerned with the plain-
ly offensive manner in which it is conveyed." Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 971.
249 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2628 (2007).
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Can a school adopt an abstinence-only policy and prohibit all speech
of a sexual nature?
2
'
50
As discussed above, greater discretion afforded to school officials
in some cases leads to suppression of speech that would otherwise be
permissible according to the Supreme Court's school speech juri-
sprudence. The same idea holds true with a confused jurispru-
dence. Although Tinker continues to be applied, many courts apply
Fraser or Kuhlmeier in circumstances where Tinker is the appropriate
standard-some courts even treating Tinker as though it has been
overruled.2 2  Similarly, at least two courts have already expanded
Morse to speech other than that which advocates illegal drug use.25S
Thus, after Morse it is quite likely that the trend of greater discretion
and greater confusion will continue and even increase. 4
V. LIMITING PRINCIPLES: ARE OTHER TYPES OF SPEECH VULNERABLE?
A. How Liberally Should Morse Be Interpreted?
Boim v. Fulton County School District, which involved speech that
could reasonably be interpreted as threatening violence, shows that
courts may be willing to interpret Morse beyond its narrow drug ex-
ception. At first glance, Boim's expansion may look like a reasonable
one. After all, both school violence and illicit drug use are illegal,
and both are serious problems facing the nation's schools. Despite
these concerns, one must question whether it is actually necessary to
expand Morse to speech threatening school violence. Such speech, if
actually threatening, can be suppressed under Tinke's material and
substantial disruption standard as well as under Watts v. United
States, 5' which holds that the government may restrict true
250 See Caudillo ex rel. Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 311 F. Supp. 2d 550,
563 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (upholding the denial of access to school facilities to a gay stu-
dent group because some of the group's messages conflicted with an abstinence-only
school policy).
2D1 See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
252 See Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 542.
253 See supra notes 161-67, 173-77 and accompanying text.
2 In Bar-Navon v. School Board of Brevard County, No. 6:06-cv-1434-Orl-19KRS, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82044 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2007), a case decided after Morse, the court
noted that courts at all levels are confused about the scope of Tinkers holding, and
that Morse "did little to clarify the scope of Tinker's holding." Id. at 15. See also D.G. v.
Florida, 961 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Morse for the proposition
that great weight should be afforded to the judgment of school officials).
255 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
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"threats."256  Furthermore, the concept of moral panic cautions
against expanding Morse, because the true gravity of the student drug
use and school violence problems, and the uncertainty of whether
the restriction of ambiguous speech has any effect on decreasing ei-
ther problem,5 7 may not warrant the curtailment of a fundamental
right. There may also be more effective means for dealing with these
issues. For example, when objectionable speech is uttered in school,
"the resolution should not focus on silencing the offender, but on
educating both the offending and the offended about appropriate
responses., 25 Instead of simply punishing students by way of a sus-
pension 25: (as a first resort), school officials should take the time to
educate their students about First Amendment principles, including
how to properly exercise First Amendment rights in the school envi-
ronment.
260
Expansion of Morse to other speech may also place the narrow
holding on a slippery slope. Rather than applying Morse to speech
256 Id. at 708. In Watts, the petitioner was convicted for violating a federal statute
that prohibited "knowingly and willfully... [making] any threat to take the life of or
to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States." Id. at 705. The peti-
tioner made the following statements in a discussion group at a public rally: "[Niow I
have received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical
this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man
I want to get in my sights is L.BJ." Id. at 706. In reversing the conviction, the Su-
preme Court held that petitioner's speech was not a true "threat" but rather "politi-
cal hyperbole." Id. at 708.
257 See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
258 Hudson & Ferguson, supra note 12, at 207; see id. at 207 n.211 (notingJustice
Brandeis's famous quote from his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 377 (1927), "[i]f there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood
and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied
is more speech, not enforced silence"). Justice Brandeis also stated in Whitney that
"[a]mong free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are edu-
cation .... not abridgement of the rights of free speech and assembly." 274 U.S. at
378 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Hudson and Ferguson further ex-
plain that:
[c]ensorship [should be used] as a last resort, instead of the first. Civ-
ics and character education, peer counseling, opportunities for expres-
sion and debate of ideas that may be outside the mainstream, and oth-
er alternative education opportunities not only protect the free
expression rights of students, but they also provide a more robust edu-
cational environment that leads to better educated students.
Hudson & Ferguson, supra note 12, at 207; see also Stephen Kanter, BONG HiTS 4
JESUS as a Cautionary Tale of Two Cities, 12 LEwis & CLARK L. REX'. 61 (2008).
Interestingly, Clay Calvert notes that "[r]esearch demonstrates that suspen-
sions fail to modify negative behavior." Calvert, supra note 218, at 765 (citation omit-
ted).
See CHARLES C. HAYNES ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN SCHOOLS: A GUIDE
FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER 17-21 (2003).
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concerning drug use and perhaps school violence, courts may further
expand Morse to other speech deemed contrary to the school's educa-
tional mission. Such an interpretation of Morse was made by the
court in Doninger v. Niehoff161 in which the court interpreted Morse as
expanding Fraser to on-campus speech advocating illegal drug use-
speech deemed contrary to the educational mission of the school-
and read the case as permitting the punishment of a student for post-
ing objectionable language critical of school administrators on a In-
ternet blog. 2 2 With such an expansion comes possible further expan-
sion due to subjective beliefs as to what type of speech is contrary to a
school's educational mission. 3
B. Religious Speech
An amicus brief filed by the Christian Legal Society in support of
Frederick warned the Supreme Court that "undue deference to pub-
lic school power . . .would . . .end up undermining legitimate ex-
pressions of religion by public school students., 26 4 One of the Chris-
tian Legal Society's main concerns was that school officials may
silence some religious speech simply because they believe it is "offen-
sive."265 The Supreme Court was sympathetic to this concern as it
held that Fraser cannot be extended to suppress speech that is merely
"offensive. 2 6r The Christian Legal Society also noted that, besides
labeling speech offensive, some school officials believe that religious
expression can invade the rights of others, because it may be discri-
minatory or be interpreted as a "verbal assault., 217 The Morse Court
did not specifically address the boundaries of this part of the Tinker
standard.2
261 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007).
262 Id. at 213.
263 See Hudson & Ferguson, supra note 12, at 201-03; Peterson, supra note 239, at
943-47. The problem of subjectivity does not necessarily concern the school's edu-
cational mission itself; rather, subjectivity comes into play when school officials de-
cide what speech is contrary to a particular educational mission. See, e.g., supra note
156.
24 Brief for Christian Legal Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at
2, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278), 2007 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 222 [hereinafter Brief for CLS].
265 Id. at 12.
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007) (noting that both religious
and political speech may be offensive).
267 Brief for CLS, supra note 264, at 6-7.
268 As noted above, the Tinker standard permits suppression of speech that mate-
rially and substantially interferes with appropriate discipline in school or if it "in-
trudes upon the . . .rights of other[s]." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
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In fact, in Harper v. Poway Unified School District,'69 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Tinker permits
school officials to prohibit a t-shirt bearing a biblical phrase critical of
homosexuality because it "colli[des] with the rights of other stu-
dents."27 The Christian Legal Society also notes that many school
districts argue that allowing certain religious speech in their schools
would interfere with the schools' educational mission.271 Thus, al-
though Morse rejected expanding Fraser to allow proscription of of-
fensive speech, such speech may be silenced if it is deemed to collide
with the rights of other students. In light of the amount of discretion
that courts are willing to accord to school officials, subjective judg-
ments of whether speech collides with the rights of others or inter-
feres with a school's educational mission may withstand scrutiny.
Courts should therefore scrutinize restrictions on religious speech in
schools more scrupulously.
C. Speech Concerning Homosexual Sex
In Caudillo ex rel. Caudillo v. Lubbock Independent School District
272
(decided before Morse), the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas upheld the denial of access to school facil-
ities to a gay student group because part of the group's message con-
flicted with the school's abstinence-only policy.2 " According to the
court, the group's website contained links to indecent material, and
"the group's goal of discussing sex [fell] within the purview of speech
of an indecent nature."274 The group's speech was thus "beyond the
bounds of First Amendment protection in the public school set-
269 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
270 Id. at 1178 (internal quotations omitted); see also Hsu ex rel. Hsu v. Roslyn Un-
ion Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839, 872-73 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[Wlhen a sectarian
religious club discriminates on the basis of religion for the purpose of assuring the
sectarian religious character of its meetings, a school must allow it to do so unless
that club's specific form of discrimination would be invidious ... or would otherwise
disrupt or impair the school's educational mission.").
271 Brief for CLS, supra note 264, at 18-19 (citing Hsu, 85 F.3d 839). Although in
Hsu the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ultimately rejected
this argument, the district court accepted it, concluding that "a school-recognized
club that is permitted to discriminate on the basis of religion likely would be disrup-
tive to the educational mission of the school, because it would be invidious and
would impinge on the rights of other Roslyn students to be free from discrimination
in school." Hsu, 85 F.3d at 871 (internal citation and quotations omitted).
M 311 F. Supp. 2d 550 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
273 Id. The court's decision rested on both First Amendment and Equal Access
Act grounds. Id. at 559. This Comment discusses only the First Amendment aspects
and implications of the decision, regarding the Tinker trilogy specifically.
274 Id. at 563.
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ting. 72  The court further explained that the school's abstinence-
only policy was consistent with Kuhlmeier, because "' [a] school need
not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic educa-
tional mission.0'
27 6
Although the Caudillo decision may be erroneous for a plethora
of reasons,217 Morse, if expanded, may permit the proscription of
speech in this case. Significantly, Texas law makes it a crime for mi-
nors of the same sex to engage in sexual acts. 27' Because of this pro-
hibition, speech concerning homosexual sex between minors can be
compared to speech concerning illegal drug use. One may argue
that simply discussing the activity does not constitute encouragement
or advocacy; however, it is very likely that speech "discussing" engag-
ing in illegal drug use would be proscribable under Morse. Thus, dis-
cussion of homosexual sex may likewise be proscribable under Morse's
reasoning.
Further, unquestioning deference to school officials may also
permit the suppression of such speech. A troubling aspect of accord-
ing too much discretion to school officials in this context is that the
Caudillo court agreed with the school district that suppression of all
speech concerning sex is permissible under Fraser. Such speech
suppression allows a school district to inculcate into its students that a
particular moral or religious view, in this case the propriety of absti-
nence or the wrongfulness of premarital sex, is the appropriate moral
view to hold. To argue that the Fraser Court intended to allow the si-
lencing of any and all discussion of sex is a drastic overexpansion of
the meaning of offensive and vulgar language. Caudillo is also yet
another example of the way in which a school district can utilize Fras-
eis and Kuhlmeiers "inconsistent with its basic educational mission"
language to impose on its students a particular religious or moral
view. Although schools will inevitably inculcate certain values, it does
not follow that school officials should have the discretion to impose
upon their students whichever values they may choose at all times
and in all places. In other words, particular values are undoubtedly
emphasized as part of the curriculum, but expression of contrary val-
ues by students outside of the curriculum context should not be pro-
275 Id. at 564.
276 Id. at 563 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988)).
277 See Alice Riener, Comment, Pride and Prejudice: The First Amendment, the Equal
Access Act, and the Legal Fight for Gay Student Groups in High Schools, 14 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 613, 624-42 (2006).
278 See Caudillo, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 558 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)
(Vernon 2003)).
279 Id. at 562-63.
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scribed unless such expression causes a material and substantial dis-
ruption to the orderly operation of the school.28° The inculcation of
values in a manner that suppresses or prohibits competing values
should be limited to certain "core" values that are necessary to the
orderly administration of a public education 28' and "values essential
to the meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a self-
governing citizenry.",
82
Although the discussion relating to the expansion of Morse to
prohibit other types of speech may be speculative to a certain degree,
it is not altogether improbable. Some of the cases discussed above
show that both Fraser and Kuhlmeier were expanded beyond the scope
of their holdings and were applied to suppress speech that should
have been analyzed under the Tinker standard. Similarly, some courts
have already begun expanding Morse beyond its narrow drug excep-
tion. Such expansion allows school officials to prohibit speech not
because of its propensity to cause material and substantial disruption
or to collide with the rights of others, but because of subjective disa-
greement with the content of the speech or overreaction.
VI. CONCLUSION
By creating a drug exception to Tinker, Morse creates the third in
a series of content-based exceptions to Tinker's material and substan-
280 As noted above, the Kuhlmeier Court was explicit in stating that the material
disruption standard applies outside of the curriculum context. See supra note 136.
To elaborate further, conveyance of a particular moral or religious view as part of a
school's educational mission may not in and of itself be troubling. What is troubling,
however, is the suppression of competing or contrary views. For example, American
public schools undoubtedly attempt to inculcate in their students the notion that the
United States is "a great country." But, as part of this attempt, schools do not prohi-
bit students to voice a contrary or alternative opinion, such as "America is not a great
country," or "France is a great country"-assuming, one supposes, that a substantial
disruption is not being caused by the voicing of such opinions. Similarly, schools
may inculcate a particular religious or moral view as part of their educational mis-
sion, but it should not follow that the suppression of contrary or alternative views is
necessary to the effective inculcation of any given view.
281 C.f Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, Wat Did You Learn in School Today? Free
Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REv.
62, 69 (2002) (proposing an "'anti-indoctrination' model of First Amendment inter-
pretation, for the judiciary to reasonably police the educational process in order to
restrict values inculcation to that essential minimum degree required for the educa-
tional process to function"); see also Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The
Conflict Between Authority and Individual Rights in the Public School 95 YALE L.J. 1647,
1671 (1986); Lisa Shaw Roy, Inculcation, Bias, and Viewpoint Discrimination in Public
Schools, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 647, 654-67 (2005).
NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 373 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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tial disruption test. Although Tinker has not been overruled, the ex-
pansion of Morse, Fraser, and Kuhimeier has the propensity to render
Tinker negligible to a large extent. 2 3 Many courts distinguish student
speech from the speech involved in Tinker as not being political.
Consequently, courts are more willing to apply one of the content-
based exceptions to speech that does not have a political message. In
some cases, speech that contains a political message is nevertheless
being censored pursuant to one of the content-based exceptions to
Tinker. Even if Tinker still has significant force with regard to politi-
cal speech, substantial protection for only political speech is simply
not sufficient. Protection of such speech is not the sole purpose of
the First Amendment. 28 5 Among the various justifications for the First
Amendment, "autonomy" or "self-realization" theories,286 which stress
the individual's right to self-realization and self-determination, de-
mand the protection of speech other than political speech, particu-
larly in light of the fact that adolescence is a crucial stage in the de-
velopment of self-identity. 287  Increased suppression of non-political
student speech (which may further increase with the expansion of
content-based exceptions), may have a detrimental effect on the de-
velopment of self-identity if children are not able to meaningfully en-
28 See Wilborn, supra note 56, at 137 ("[T]he practical effect of the Fras-
er/ [Kuhimeier] judicial deference to school officials leaves little real protection for
student expression not endorsed by school authorities. In short, the school authori-
ties may label the speech and then suppress it, without fear of serious judicial over-
sight.").
284 See, e.g., Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989).
2 See, e.g., KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 20-25 (2003).
286 See id. at 27-29.
287 See ROBERT SIEGLER ET AL., How CHILDREN DEVELOP 432-33 (2003); Holning
Lau, Pluralism, A Principle for Children's Rights, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 317, 324-27,
354 (2007).
[A] dolescents tend to increasingly think about political or religious sys-
tems of beliefs and values, and often feel the need to figure out who
they are in terms of these belief and value systems. Many adolescents
and young adults make commitments to religious or political ideolo-
gies after exploring various options .... Adolescents must also sort
through beliefs and values that guide sexual behavior, such as those re-
garding whether or not premarital sex is acceptable. Some adolescents
and young adults also have to deal with their sexual identity-that is,
acknowledging whether they are heterosexual, gay or lesbian, or bisex-
ual.
SIEGLER ETAL., supra, at 432. Both Lau and Siegler et al. discuss Erik Erikson's theory
of identity formation. Erikson argued that the primary developmental task in ado-
lescence is the resolution of the various identity issues discussed by Siegler et al. Id.
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gage in self-expression."" Although the strength of free expression
justifications is diminished due to the special characteristics of the
school environment,"' as well as the immaturity of children,29 these
factors are to a substantial degree already taken into consideration in
the Supreme Court's student speech cases. That is, Tinker and its
progeny recognize the special characteristics of the school environ-
ment and the vulnerable nature of children, and have tailored stu-
dent speech jurisprudence to take account of these realities. 91
In addition to the content-based exceptions and the overexpan-
sion thereof, courts are increasingly deferential to school officials.
Such deference allows school officials to silence speech they subjec-
tively find objectionable under the pretense that it interferes with the
school's educational mission, is indecent, or otherwise. While judges
should defer to the decisions of school officials in many circums-
tances-when a split-second decision has been made or when a deci-
sion to maintain order has been made-courts must be cognizant of
the propensity of public schools to indoctrinate children and should
be wary about according too much deference where subjective beliefs
or overreactions may influence censorship. Courts should be critical
(and thus less deferential) when analyzing cases involving religious
speech, speech concerning sex, drug activity, school violence, and
other potentially controversial speech.
Due to the confused state of the Supreme Court's school speech
jurisprudence, many courts apply one of the exceptions to Tinker in
situations where the actual Tinker test is the more appropriate stan-
dard. It is certainly true that not all courts over-expand the excep-
tions to Tinker, however, most lower courts tend to take a school au-
thority-friendly approach in their analysis of school speech. The
combination of these factors has resulted in many types of speech be-
ing analyzed based on content, with Morse only further perpetuating
this trend. Although a content-based test may not be problematic per
se, limits need to be delineated so that school officials, as well as
courts, do not over-expand permissible restrictions. The Supreme
288 See Lau, supra note 287, at 338-39 (noting that "[plrotecting children's identity
expression means protecting children's ability to make outward representations of
that internal sense of self").
289 See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007) (stating that "the rights of
students must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environ-
ment" (internal citations omitted)).
SAUNDERS, supra note 285, at 38-42.
291 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2618; Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260
(1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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Court should definitively rule that a school may not censor speech
due to the fact that the content thereof conflicts with a purported
"educational mission" of the school. Justice Alito's concurring opi-
nion in Morse along with several lower court decisions show that
"educational mission" can be defined in a subjective manner to in-
clude the inculcation of social or political values of the school's ad-
ministration. Additionally, school officials can easily suppress speech
because it is contrary to a particular educational mission as a way to
subvert the prohibition on restricting speech merely because it is of-
fensive.
Lastly, Morse should be applied only to speech advocating illegal
drug use. Expansion of Morse to speech reasonably interpreted as
threatening school violence may lead courts down a slippery slope.
Further, such speech, if in fact disruptive, can be restricted under
Tinkers material and substantial disruption standard, and if the
speech is deemed a "true threat," it can be suppressed under Watts.
Such a broad interpretation may result in school officials attempting
to argue that speech advocating (or simply concerning) any and all
illegal or harmful activities should be censored, regardless of whether
it causes a material or substantial disruption. M
In sum, courts cannot allow fear and zeal to dictate the nature of
students' constitutional rights. Without meaningful judicial review
and a clear framework to guide lower courts, the future of student
expression rights looks bleak indeed.
292 See Denning & Taylor, supra note 153, at 865.
20091 1101
HeinOnline -- 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1101 2009
HeinOnline -- 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1102 2009
